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The central states of the United Kingdom and China are committed to ﬁnding effective ways to govern
normative sustainability programmes. A more sustainable waste policy solution than landﬁll is energy-
from-waste (EfW). The governmentality perspective suggests that, to achieve such policy ends,
compliance is required from a range of actors who operate at a distance from central states. This paper is
the ﬁrst to draw together theoretical comparisons of Western neoliberal and Chinese governmentality in
the context of waste governance. We ﬁnd that long-standing liberal approaches to power and policy-
making witnessed in the UK have parallels with a hybrid mix of socialist governance and Chinese gov-
ernmentality. Beijing seeks to govern not via neoliberal tactics of ‘freedom and liberty’, but rather
through a distinct planning and administrative rationality. Our comparative case study approach allows
us to illustrate the dual facilitative and authoritarian dimensions to ‘top-down’ compliance given ‘bot-
tom-up’ counter claims of expertise by citizen scientists and other activists in local communities. This
analysis in turn reveals how power plays out between state actors, corporations and local communities in
these two different political and planning systems. We suggest that the progressive development of lay
expertise in environmental health risks is a dynamic marker of the limits to the top-down imposition of
waste policy in both countries. Our approach to comparative analysis draws attention to the need to
revisit approaches to neoliberal Western governmentality and to extend empirical investigations using
illiberal Chinese governmentality.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
The UK and Chinese central states are committed to ﬁnding
effective ways to govern normative shifts towards greater sus-
tainability. However, both countries face serious difﬁculties with
their national waste management strategies. In the face of dwin-
dling options for landﬁll, each country has committed itself to large
construction programmes of energy-from-waste (EfW) plants. Both
states support technological claims made by developers and engi-
neers that newer EfW facilities are more sustainable than the
previous generation of incinerators. EfW plants reclaim energy
from burning unrecoverable municipal solid waste (MSW). De-
livery of this new waste infrastructure, however, is well behind
schedule in both countries. Corporate claims for EfW sustainability
are heavily contested by environmental non-governmentalking), FlynnAC@cardiff.ac.uk
Ltd. This is an open access article uorganisations (NGOs) and members of dissenting affected
communities.
In this article, we use a mixture of our own research, a review of
secondary sources and a comparative analytical framework to show
how the planning systems of both England andWales and China act
as governmental technologies of central control. In this context, we
suggest that power plays out very similarly between state actors,
developers and local communities in both countries and that there
are dynamic limits are to the top-down imposition of centralised
waste policies. This comparative analytical approach extends
descriptive models of governmentality into waste governance in
both countries showing that key critical dimensions such as public
participation are similarly rarely meaningful in either country. We
examine local events in four case studies, two from each country.
Events are assessed longitudinally in timelines in the
supplementary material. This material reveals that, even when the
state achieves its policy ends (i.e. constructing an EfW plant), po-
litical challenges to these new facts on the ground remain. Such
dissent arises due to perceived negative social, economic andnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Our social constructivist analytical framework examines the
competing logics of actors involved in contesting the siting and
technology of EfW plants. We offer insights into neoliberal gov-
ernmentality, Chinese illiberal governmentality and ‘rhizomatic’
resistance, a concept from Deleuze and Guattari (1987). The terms
rhizome and rhizomatic are part of a powerful notion borrowed
from biology - a metaphor for the unlimited horizontal growth of
root systems. When applied to analysis of past events, the rhizo-
matic approach is characterized by “ceaselessly established con-
nections between semiotic chains, organisations of power, and
circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles.”
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, 7). As Semetsky (2003, 18) indicates, a
rhizome, or network of dissenting actors: “[multiplies] its own lines
and establishing the plurality of unpredictable connections in the
open-ended… smooth, space of its growth.” Smooth or ‘ﬂuid space’
is irregular, open and heterogeneous. This is contrasted to striated
space which has rigid schemata and ﬁxed points ordered by hier-
archical power (Allen, 2016; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Murdoch,
2006; Semetsky, 2003).
In our analysis, we suggest parallels between the reactions to
the top-down imposition of governmental policy at a distance - via
‘technologies’ of measurement e in these neoliberal and illiberal
states. Both countries wish to govern through inﬂuencing the
choices, aspirations and capacities of individuals (cf. Dean, 1999;
Foucault, 1991; Jeffreys & Sigley, 2009; MacKinnon, 2000).
Hindess (1996, 77), for example, suggests that the similarities are:
“more signiﬁcant than the obvious doctrinal points on which they
differ.” We conclude that our empirical evidence and insights
demonstrate the value of extending descriptive models of gov-
ernmentality and rhizomatic resistance into waste governance
analyses in both countries (cf. Bulkeley,Watson, Hudson,&Weaver,
2005; Jeffreys & Sigley, 2014).Fig. 1. Three networks operatingWith waste policy governance, we propose a typology (Fig. 1).
There are three types of networks of actors in both countries e
developers, regulators and dissenters. The agency of the ﬁrst two is
constrained by striated space. Dissenters occupy ﬂuid space. In both
countries, we document social struggles involving dissent by
communities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) against
powerful, hierarchical actors embedded in institutional structures
of governance. We characterise such dissent in terms of rhizomatic
resistance. This approach suggests how, where, when and why the
limits to the top-down governmental ‘imposition’ of waste policy
are contested (Hacking & Flynn, 2017). Opposing framings of risk of
different actors are characterized in terms of: 1) asymmetric power
relations in national planning systems (Murdoch, 2006), 2) the
inﬂuence of network linkage to traditional and social media which
amplify risk perceptions (Kasperson et al., 1988), 3) speciﬁc geog-
raphies of resistance (Keith& Pile, 2013) and, 4) the development of
alternative expertise based on citizen science (Wynne, 1996).
Alternative expertise is interesting because expertise and legiti-
macy are so heavily fought over by opposing actors, particularly
regarding environmental health risk perceptions (Whatmore,
2009).
We argue that the progressive development of lay expertise
regarding environmental health risks (and its diffusion via social
media) acts as a dynamic indicator of the limits to the top-down
governance of waste policy. We suggest governmentality studies
should pay more attention to understanding the dynamic nature of
rhizomatic dissenter responses (cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). Our
research also offers insights into how and why power plays out
similarly between actors given analogous waste planning and
administrative rationalities in two very different political systems.
Our approach to neoliberal and illiberal governmentalities, sum-
marised in diagrammatic form (Fig. 1), enables insights into: 1) the
asymmetric nature of power relations between state actors,in striated and ﬂuid space.
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reshape these asymmetric power relations through developing
their technical expertise as citizen scientists, 3) how and why
protesting communities enrol other actors (at a distance) with
alternative scientiﬁc expertise to bolster their campaigning and, 4)
how and why waste management technology is framed as a sus-
tainable solution. Ultimately, our comparative analytical approach
demonstrates the value of our interpretation of governmentality in
terms of the nature of protest and its longevity and how and why
the state's policy aims, even when fulﬁlled, remain contested.
In terms of the structure of this paper, our reviews of waste
management governance in the UK and China involve character-
ising: 1) the comparative nature of neoliberal and illiberal ap-
proaches to environmental governance, 2) the national land use
planning system and how its use as a technology of measurement
for the delivery of waste policy, and 3) examples of top-down na-
tional and regional instruments and guidance. We then review and
compare four EfW case studies, two each from England and Wales
and China. The case studies illustrate the dual facilitative and
authoritarian dimensions to top-down compliancewith centralised
waste management policies via comparisons between the state's
top-down claims for legitimacy and bottom-up counter claims of
expertise by citizen scientists and activists in local communities.
Comparative waste governance
In this section, we undertake a comparative review of different
understandings of governmentality in the context of the UK and
China. This is then applied to each country's respective land use
planning system to characterise their institutional approaches to
waste governance. With EfW waste policies, we argue that the
central states in China and the UK are dealing with very similar
social, economic and technical dynamics on the ground (despite
their very different political systems). This comparative picture
covers upstream framings of waste as a policy problem and
downstream consequences of that framing in terms of technology
choices and site selection (Wynne,1992). In both countries, the top-
down imperative with waste governance policies is determined by
the urgent need to overcome the landﬁll capacity problem. In the
next section, we characterise Western neoliberal and Chinese
illiberal approaches to governmentality.
Neoliberal and illiberal governmentalities
Discursive forms of governmentality provide “an alternative
basis from which to conceptualise the nature of governing”
(Bulkeley, Watson, & Hudson, 2007, 2736). They explain the de-
mands and social dynamics of governing a modern state, how po-
wer relations are exercised relationally, and the potential for
geographies of resistance (Pile & Keith, 1997; Dean, 1999; McKee,
2009). Faced with policy problems with divisive outcomes (cf.
Alty & Darke, 1987; Davoudi & Atkinson, 1999), responses by actors
to displays of power in the planning arena result in adaptation
(MacKinnon, 2000) or resistance (Raco, 2003). With concepts of
both liberal and illiberal forms of governmentality ewhat Foucault
termed the study of the “conduct of conduct” (Defert & Ewald,
1994, 237) - power relations are seen as all-pervasive and
expressed relationally between actors (Dean, 1999; Foucault,
Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Miller & Rose, 1990). Power can
be exercised oppressively instead of achieving liberal freedoms
(Foucault, 1975, 1980). As Bevir (1999, 69) summarises: “[L]iberal
freedom [is] … impossible … modern reason excludes … the way
modern power dominates the individual.” Foucault's work also
underpins an illiberal version - Chinese governmentality - as we
discuss below. What is important to both is the state's need tosuccessfully project power at a distance and so retain a measure of
control over its territory. Governmentality suggests the ‘power to’
achieve things at a distance (i.e. agency) is expressed relationally
via relatively rigid networks held together by ‘immutable mobiles’
or activity which strengthens a network's relational links (Latour,
1987). Such activity is therefore underpinned by ‘technologies’ of
measurement - e.g. accounting systems, spatial plans, and devel-
opment plans, in the case of a planning system - which shapes
human conduct at a distance from the centres of calculation (Barry,
1996). Immutable mobiles help align governed actors particularly
in geographically remote areas (MacKinnon, 2000; Murdoch,
2004).
“[I]f we want to do an analysis of power … we must speak of
powers and try to localize them in their historical and geograph-
ical speciﬁcity” (Foucault, 1976, cited in Crampton & Elden, 2007,
156, our italics).
In the case of EfW, neoliberal states use top-down networks
providing immutable mobiles, their planning system and a state
regulator to measure the ﬁnancial and physical inputs and outputs
at sites at a distance from centres of calculation, such as Brussels,
London or Cardiff, to determine the attainment of policy objectives
(Bulkeley et al., 2005, 2007). State power creates new knowledge,
including geographical data, to further ‘steer’ actors and individuals
in more distant territorial spaces (O Tuathail, 1996; Rose-Redwood,
2006). However, dissenting actor networks enter into ‘trials of
strength’ (Latour, 1987, 78) with state-backed actor networks to
undermine the political and technological claims of pro-EfWactors.
Who ‘wins’ a trial of strength depends on the strongest network of
actors and resources (Murdoch, 2006).
There are a wide range of indirect ways in which power struc-
tures the behaviour of individuals and organisations (Allen, 2004).
Stakeholders behave responsibly because they understand what
acceptable behaviour is and what they imagine to be the reality of
their own circumstances (Grifﬁn, 2012). With waste management,
protestors can be acutely aware of their operational context in
terms of individual/collective behaviour (see case studies below).
Allen (2004, 23) therefore suggests that for “embedded institu-
tional practices”, governmentality is a plausible explanation for
constrained agency. For instance, regulatory ‘intrusions’ into local
spaces shapes the distinct responses that communities are
‘permitted’ to pursue. However, the top-down imposition of an EfW
policy by a central state, its regulators, local government and de-
velopers in our case studies typically fails to recognise deep-rooted
local historical speciﬁcities of communities.
In a succinct critique of neoliberal governmentality, Grifﬁn
(2012) makes two pertinent points. Firstly, regulatory and state/
developer networks draw upon much greater resources than dis-
senters in exercising their power. Secondly, the governmentality
perspective underplays individual agency by suggesting that actors'
activities are steered via dominant discourses, such as neoliberal
environmental governance used for the regulation of polluting in-
dustries. As we shall see both points matter in our case studies.
There are, of course, limits to what can be achieved by liberal
states deploying top-down imposition of policies. In theoretical
terms, Deleuze and Guattari were concerned with how “capitalism
and the state function as apparatuses of capture” (Purcell, 2013, 30).
They suggest unfettered capitalism creates instability and upheaval
while the state tries to manage economic production. The state
must impose its will on institutions and individuals via a “whole
apparatus of regulation” to govern economic relations (Deleuze,
Guattari, & Massumi, 1977, 252). Normative approaches to public
participation are therefore challenged via “revolutionary connec-
tions” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, 473). Concerned with transition
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474) advocate freeing individuals from state-controlled “striated
space” (Fig. 1). Such dissent may occur in cross-cutting, bottom-up
fora in “free space”. This space is non-metric, relational and acen-
tred (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, 17). Rhizomes are a ‘‘non-hierar-
chical, non-signifying system without a General and without an
organising memory or central automaton, deﬁned solely by a cir-
culation of states’’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, 21). Rhizomes self-
organize, challenging the state's top-down projection of power.
Coyne (2008, 558) says they are “parasitic on established structures
[growing] from within to subvert the ediﬁce.” Rhizomes are “en-
tities in which each member has the potential to communicate
horizontally with any other” (Purcell, 2013, 27). However, not all
forms of dissent automatically equatedwith ‘rhizomatic’ resistance.The land use planning system in England and Wales
The planning system matters because new EfW plant requires
land use decisions. The planning system in England and Wales in-
volves a top-down administrative hierarchy centred on London. Its
structure, shown in Fig. 2, involves policies and plans made by four
inﬂuential departmental bodies of the UK's central state:
 HM Treasury - responsible for national economic planning. So-
cial and economic spending plans - ‘Budgets’ - tend not to
extend beyond the ﬁve-year lifetime of each elected Parliament.
 The Department for Communities and Local Government
(DCLG) - includes guidance for Local Government on how to
achieve national planning policy. This guidance's stated aims
include greater public participation.
 The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(BEIS) - created in the summer of 2016 has responsibility for
businesses, science, innovation, energy and climate change.Fig. 2. England and Wales' hierarchical planning system.
Based on: various UK government online resources. The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(DEFRA) - formulates and promotes national standards of
environmental protection, manages, monitors and enforces
environmental protection along with the Environment Agency
(EA) in England (and the EA's equivalent bodies in Northern
Ireland, Scotland and Wales).
These departmental policies and plans are communicated in
turn to sub-national government (Ayres & Pearce, 2013). There are
devolved planning powers available to the nations in Northern
Ireland, Scotland and Wales and these powers include waste
governance. A major barrier to the operation of the planning sys-
tem, however, is interdepartmental rivalry within the central state
in London.
The leading central state institutions have the greatest inﬂuence
on development planning and act as centres of calculation. These
key departments therefore use various means of measuring the
activity of other less powerful actors (e.g. budgets, targets, perfor-
mance indicators). These are the relationally linked immutable
mobiles which help stabilise the policy-led network from within
the formal planning system but at a (geographical) distance in the
provinces/nations/regions and cities. Land-use activities are made
visible through the immutable mobiles involving statistical and
spatial data for analysis, problematisation and new policy formu-
lation at centres of calculation.Institutional approaches to waste governance in England and Wales
In England and Wales, the European Union leads reform of
waste governance. This is chieﬂy via the Waste Framework Direc-
tive (75/44/EC) and the Landﬁll Directive (99/31/EC) (see
Supplementary Material e England and Wales's waste-related pol-
icies). When the Waste Management Licensing Regulations (1994)
were put on the UK's statute books, energy recovery was
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posting in the waste hierarchy. The waste policy agenda thus
became more sympathetic to the possibility of EfW. The industry
expanded tomeet rising policy-led demand. InWales, where two of
our case studies come from, this picture is further complicated by
political devolution. From the early 2000s, the National Assembly
for Wales (now the Welsh Government) has produced its own
waste management strategies (see Supplementary Material e En-
gland and Wales's waste-related policies). In 2002, recycling targets
in Wales were more ambitious than in England and markedly less
sympathetic to EfW, but the position on EfW has since become
more favourable.
Waste incineration dissenter activity in the UK accelerated from
the 1980s. It should be seen as a response to this increased pro-
motion of EfW as a waste management solution by central gov-
ernment and its associated agencies. In particular, reframing
incineration as a waste solution via the energy recovery is seen by
some dissenters as a state ‘tactic’ to improve the incineration's
legitimacy and so gain acceptance by communities earmarked for a
development (other ‘tactics’ identiﬁed by UK dissenters include
promises of signiﬁcant numbers of local jobs and apprenticeships
and district heating systems to combat localised fuel poverty).
The governmentality perspective suggests one of the key ob-
servations about communities in England and Wales faced with
EfW proposals is the localised development of an 'alternative'
expertise on incineration based on ‘citizen science’ and the pre-
cautionary principle (Irwin & Wynne, 1996; Wynne, 1996).
Knowledge and expertise about incinerator and EfW technology,
the environmental impacts and the alternatives are shared via
networks within and between dissenting communities. This
knowledge exchange includes input from some non-governmental
organisations and academic researchers (see the case studies).
Communities, therefore, have access to knowledge, alternative
expertise and support that they might not normally have expected
when challenging the dominant framing of a public policy problem.
Such bottom-up, countervailing responses to the UK's top-down
implementation of its evolving waste policy present central gov-
ernment with a tangible sense of the limits to compliance with its
neoliberal policy edicts. Some dissenting communities in England
and Wales have acquired more power and inﬂuence in their inev-
itably asymmetric contestations with the state over EfW plants by
presenting their alternative expertise as an increasingly legitimised
form of knowledge (Hacking & Flynn, 2017). Whether successful or
not in individual localities, governmentality suggests that the
wholesale rejection of the state's expertise on EfW means that, for
central and local government, EfW strategy is increasingly prob-
lematic to deliver.
Chinese illiberal governmentality
Extending Foucault's Western theoretical concept of gov-
ernmentality to a non-Western context might appear ‘Eurocentric’.
However, there is a long-standing literature on Chinese gov-
ernmentality (e.g. Anagnost, 2006; Bray, 2006; Dutton, 1992;
Greenhalgh & Winckler, 2005; Hindess, 1996; Hoffman, 2006;
Jeffreys & Sigley, 2009, 2014; Kipnis, 2007; Sigley, 2006). Once
China liberalised economically in the 1980s, a characterisation of
the socialist arts of government based on Foucauldian antecedents,
or ‘Chinese governmentality’ followed (Bray & Jeffreys, 2016).
However, while some of the elements of neoliberal reasoning are
visible today, the “prevailing discourse on government in China
continues to approach the task of government in a distinctly Chi-
nese … and … ‘socialist’ manner.” (Sigley, 2006, 495). The neolib-
eral roll back of the central state is not being pursued in China as in
the West. Instead, the state is intervening in different ways,combining both neoliberal and socialist, facilitative and authori-
tarian strategies (Bray, 2006; Jeffreys & Sigley, 2009). Thus, the
simultaneously different neoliberal governmental contexts be-
tween China and the UK are familiar and demand a highly nuanced
comparative analysis as outlined below.
Hindess (1996) suggests that, in China, there is neither a
distinctly socialist nor liberal 'technology' of government. Instead,
both political traditions suggest the central state should aim to
realize a community of individuals who can largely regulate their
own activities. The country's political transition from socialist plan
to market socialism has involved reconﬁguring its governance
along the lines of: “scientiﬁc social engineering and socialist
planning combined with neo-liberal strategies of governing from a
distance.” (Jeffreys & Sigley, 2009, 1). Beijing has also further
incorporated a range of expertise into its ambitious plans for social
engineering from the 1980s. Foucault (1991) argues that the
increasing institutionalisation of professional expertise is a key part
of the process of governing modern central states. In China's case,
Beijing's plans have involved economic rationalization and mar-
ketization programmes in employment, education, sustainability,
and health, amongst others. (Bray, 2005; Dutton, 1992, 2008;
Greenhalgh & Winckler, 2005).
The development of the socialist market economy in 1990s in
China has thus encouraged a new form of authoritarianism for the
market, one that has many similarities with the notion of ‘good
governance’ within advanced liberal societies and global in-
stitutions. The establishment of a socialist market economy, how-
ever, has not signalled a retreat of the state. Rather, a socialist
market economy requires a powerful government that continues to
intervene but often in different, more subtle ways. Crucially, the
Communist Party of China remains important and necessary as the
ruling party in this one-party state (cf. Dean, 2010).
In summary, Chinese governmentality suggests that state actors
do not govern throughWestern neoliberal notions of ‘freedom’ and
‘liberty’. Instead, the conduct of conduct of Chinese state actors is
evidenced via their distinct economic planning and administrative
rationalities. As in the West, approaches to governance rely on a
body of technical expertise whose growth has been sponsored by
the state. Nevertheless, we argue that the limits to the top-down
Chinese system of waste governance have become apparent as
citizens have developed their own health risk expertise. Increas-
ingly, citizens demanded to be involved in decision-making via the
planning system. This is linked to the recent emergence of open
government initiatives including public participation in policy
making. The governmentality approach suggests such evidence
from the Chinese national planning system permits new insights
into the nature of Chinese governmentality in terms of relational
‘topologies of power’, i.e. how, when, where and why technologies
of measurement and control are deployed (cf. Allen, 2016; Collier,
2009).
To further appreciate how the Chinese planning system can be
considered a governmental technology of central control, the next
section offers an institutional overview of the Chinese land use
planning system.
The land use planning system in China
The planning system in China involves a top-down adminis-
trative hierarchy centred on Beijing. The hierarchical structure
shown in Fig. 3 shows how the plans of four key institutions of
central government are communicated to provincial-level, county-
and city-level, and town- and village-level government. Allocation
of land-use resources is centrally controlled via a planning system
formed prior to the market reforms of the 1980s. The competing
plans of the four key institutions produces “great uncertainties and
Fig. 3. China's hierarchical planning system.
Based on: Yu (2014).
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departmental interests (Yu, 2014, 97, cf.; Shi & Cai, 2006;; Cai,
2008;; 2010). These departments and their impact on waste
governance are outlined below:
 The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) -
responsible for 5-year national economic plans (inc. assessment
and approval of local large infrastructure development projects
applied for by local governments). The NDRC has also initiated a
type of regional plan known as development functioning zones.
 The Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development
(MoHURD) - includes national guidance on sanitation and
approval of city comprehensive plans. MoHURD works on allo-
cating housing subsidies with the NDRC and the Ministry of
Finance (Yu, 2014).
 The Ministry of Land Use and Resources (MLR) - makes land
allocations for deﬁned urban developments. The MLR designs
policies to protect cultivated land but conﬂicts typically arise
over local government land leasing.
 the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) (formerly SEPA)
- formulates and promotes national and professional norms and
standards of environmental protection.
It manages and monitors environmental protection in major
development areas and plays an active role as a coordinator in
inter-regional environmental disputes.
At the next level down in Fig. 3 are the links that make immu-
table mobiles: the key provincial departments of local government
including bureaux of urban planning, construction, environmental
protection and transport. These bodies are directly responsible to
the leading departments of the central government which in turn
use provincial bureaux to work with local city CPC chiefs and
mayors and administrators at the next two levels down in Fig. 3
(county-city and town-village) (Yu, 2014).Institutional approaches to waste governance in China
In China, rapid urbanization, population growth and industri-
alization continue to produce unprecedented increases in waste
generation. By the end of 2013, China was producing more waste
than any other country, more than seven billion tonnes of untreated
municipal solid waste (MSW), covering over three billion square
metres of land (Zhang, Huang, Xu, & Gong, 2015). Waste surrounds
two thirds of the nearly 680 cities in China andmany cities' waste is
transported to rural areas to be disposed of with Chinese cities
referred to as being under a ‘garbage siege’ or ‘waste siege’ (Li, Zhao,
Li, & Li, 2015; Xin-Gang, Gui-Wu, Ang, & Yun, 2016).
EfW plants are framed by the central state in Beijing as a way of
breaking this siege and overcoming waste management problems.
Thanks to rapidly evolving legislation (see Supplementary Material -
Chinese waste-related policies), there has been a rise in the number
of EfW proposals, sites under construction and in operation. A na-
tional plan within the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011e2015) which
appeared on April 19th, 2012, focused on the safe treatment of
waste in urban areas (Geng, 2012).
Contrary to Beijing's expectations, disquiet has grown in local
communities in the populous east as EfW plants have been
encouraged there. Concerns centre on the potential environmental
impacts and the lack of opportunities for citizens to inﬂuence de-
cisions (Johnson, 2014; Lang & Xu, 2013). The top-down imposition
of this waste policy encourages dissenter reactions in communities
which can involve direct action and the challenging of state-
supported scientiﬁc expertise including site and technology selec-
tion (Johnson, 2013a). Potentially negative environmental health
outcomes, including the cumulative contribution to localised air
pollution and climate change, are becoming more widely recog-
nized. Nevertheless, the ways that this rhizomatic resistance is
made manifest on the ground is also distinctive due to institutional
approaches to power and place-speciﬁc dissent.
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Guangzhou (Lang & Xu, 2013). They avoid the perception of overtly
challenging the authority of the state for fear of reprisals. These
typically well-organized activists use social media to covertly
inform and mobilize community members and express their
discontent with urban authorities (Sullivan & Xie, 2009; Zhang &
Nyíri, 2014). EfW dissenters in China have learned of and from
the experiences of others and so developed their own alternative
expertise as environmental activists able to undertake citizen sci-
ence and/or mobilize protests.
However, community members are also prepared to pursue
mass (direct) mobilisation particularly when public participation in
upstream and downstream policy decision making is tokenistic or
non-existent. The hybrid mix of socialist governance and Chinese
governmentality deployed to achieve the state's waste plans still do
not include the institutional and legal channels for the Chinese
public to participate meaningfully in the decision-making stages of
the planning system. Decisions on the siting of incinerators in China
have been changed as a result of such direct action which can
involve many thousands of protestors taking to the streets. Major
concessions from local government can be won, it is argued,
because Beijing prioritises political stability and typically punishes
provincial ofﬁcials for letting a localised contestation become a
mass protest (BBC, 2015).
Methods
In this paper, we draw out the dynamic nature of power re-
lations from four case studies using a mixed-method approach and
a longitudinal analytical framework (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010;
Yin, 2003). Our framework shows how events are contested, con-
structed and reconstructed by capturing:
 the nature of individuals' opposing constructions of knowledge
over time, and
 how asymmetric power relations between opposing networks
play out in space and time.
As well as a new approach to waste governance in China, our
analysis is an opportunity to reappraise the evidence for the
neoliberal governmentality approach to waste governance in the
West (Bulkeley et al., 2005, 2007). By studying actor activity pre
and post the regulator's licensing decision in both countries in a
genealogical fashion, we characterise the evolving nature of each
particular contestation over long time frames and note the simi-
larities and differences in social processes.
Our research design draws on qualitative interviews with key
stakeholders for ourWelsh case studies and analysis of quantitative
and qualitative data from secondary sources for case studies in both
countries. We note the difﬁculties of undertaking research in China
(Lang & Xu, 2013) and this inevitably produces an asymmetric
approach to primary source material weighted in favour of con-
tributions from SouthWales. Nevertheless, as part of our process of
data collection, one of the authors visited a newly built EfW plant in
Eastern China. During the visit, discussions occurred with the
management about the materials to be burnt and the planned
operating efﬁciency of the plant. Discussions also covered the siting
of the plant, the approval process and relations with the local
community. Discussions between the plant operator and the local
environmental protection body (the municipal MEP ofﬁce) were
also covered in the meeting.
For each case study, internet searches were undertaken via a
range of secondary sources from academic, media and grey litera-
ture. We also examined technical papers and reports from spe-
cialists inwaste management in both countries. These sources havehelped us to understand how EfW activity is framed, its pro-
ponents' dominant perceptions of communities and participation,
and its favoured solutions. From this analysis, four timelines were
created with reference to all actors. The timelines are divided into
three broad sections: the planning phase, the construction phase
and the operational phase. Using secondary sources of data in this
way is a well-established method of analysing relationships and
policies between tiers of government (Li & Wu, 2012). Chinese-
based researchers are interested in community attitudes to EfW,
the rising use of social media in constructing lay expertise and
dissent, and the central and local state's responses (Cai, 2008, 2010;
Johnson, 2010, 2013a, 2014). We therefore sought out such evi-
dence in secondary sources and emphasized the impact of knowl-
edge networks in our timelines. The result of these methodological
approaches is a well-rounded perspective on how EfW has come to
be a favoured waste policy solution in both countries, how it is
delivered and the nature of opposition. Our analysis is divided into
four analytical themes that are outlined in the next section.Analytical themes
We pursue four analytic themes in each case study. These
themes emerged from the coding of primary source interview
material and the collation of secondary material into timelines:
 democratic openness e opportunities for public participation
and transparency,
 expertise e dominant versus alternative framings of risk and
sustainability,
 role of space and place e the impact of socio-spatial processes
on actor interactions,
 role of regulation e how top-down governance is imposed.
These themes help us to illustratewhich factors are determining
the limits to the top-down imposition of waste policy in each case
study.Evidence and analysis
In this section, we highlight our results and analysis from each
case study making reference to their summary characteristics in
Supplementary Material. This includes Supplementary Material e
EfW Case Study Summary, site situations in Supplementary Material -
EfW Case Study Sites plus individual timelines and policy sum-
maries. The data shows how neoliberal approaches to power, pol-
icymaking and governance witnessed in the UK have many
parallels with the hybrid mix of socialist governance and Chinese
governmentality in the PRC.
The evidence summarised in the timelines suggests that the
top-down imposition of centralised waste policies at a distance
helps shape the nature and extent of dissent in that striated space.
All timelines were of a long duration, each with many events. The
planning institutions and procedures in both countries are very
similar with events moving through three phases - i) planning, ii)
construction and iii) operation e and involving impact assess-
ments. Cumulative impacts from all pollution sources are similarly
not assessed in either country. Two of these EfW facilities e
Crymlyn Burrows and Cardiff e were sited in already highly
disadvantaged areas. The general health of these two local pop-
ulations was already poor especially for vulnerable individuals.
Dissenter activity at all four sites was enabled by access to social
media (cf. Sullivan & Xie, 2009; Zhang & Nyíri, 2014). The simi-
larities continue with dissenter networks in each country overtly
and/or covertly challenging decision-making.
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Local waste authorities in England and Wales began looking at
ways of radically reducing the amount of waste sent to landﬁll from
the mid- to late-1990s in anticipation of the EC's Landﬁll Directive
(EC, 1999) (see Supplementary Material e England and Wales waste-
related policies). Failure to comply would result in ﬁnes both at the
local and national levels.
In SupplementaryMateriale Crymlyn Burrows, there is a timeline
outlining details of the £32m public-private waste partnership
between the Portuguese developer, HLC, and Neath-Port Talbot
County Borough Council (NPTCBC). Begun in 1998, this Private
Finance Initiative deal was for a Materials and Recovery Energy
Centre (MREC), an EfW plant located in Crymlyn Burrows near
Swansea's East Side, a populous and disadvantaged district where
health indicators were low (Hacking& Flynn, 2014). As the timeline
shows, the local area has a long history of environmental degra-
dation involving coal, oil and other hydrocarbon emissions, carbon
black manufacture, and hazardous chemical spillages. This place-
speciﬁc context is key to understanding much of the subsequent
resistance to the MREC: by 1998, when the facility was ﬁrst
approved by NPTCBC, various local communities were already
highly distrustful of local and national authorities' environmental
health enforcement abilities.
NPTCBC occupied striated space. Its approach to sustainable
waste management was framed in the centres of calculation and
institutional rule-making in Brussels, London and Cardiff (see
Supplementary Materiale England andWales waste-related policies).
The council therefore found its agency limited by being part of
centrally-led networks aligned with relatively rigidly via immu-
table mobiles. The council's waste planners knew that this top-
down imposition of centralised power would provoke signiﬁcant
localised resistance (Co-developer D1, 2009). NPTCBC took expert
advice recommending Crymlyn Burrows from seven potential sites
and, according to the dissenters, opted for the least perceived po-
litical risk: “It's on the border between two authorities … If [resi-
dents] kicked up a fuss, well, they could be ignored.” (NGOmember
B1, 2009). NPTCBC also took closed-doors’ expert engineering
advice on the selection of a range of more sustainable waste tech-
nologies than those built in the 1970s and 1980s. In taking such
upstream decisions, the developers, their engineers and the regu-
lator all considered themselves to be ‘rational’ in the way they
framed incineration technocratically as a low-risk process. As the
regulator argued:
“[The community] don't seem to understand that if they burn
something in their garden they are probably producing more
[dioxins]… [Also] going to the social club once a year would give
people a bigger dose of PM10 [particulate matter up to 10 mi-
crons in diameter] and plenty of other pollutants than they'll
ever get from a year's worth of living within one mile of this
incinerator” (Regulator, E1, 2009, our emphasis).
In terms of rhizomatic resistance in the freer space of the
communities, dissenters undertook direct action and some acted as
citizens scientists. Like the developers and the regulator, the dis-
senters regarded themselves as rational with their concerns about
the scientiﬁc uncertainty. Pertinently, these individuals were
asking how dioxins, furans, NO2 and ultra-ﬁne particulates impact
upon human health, either alone or in combination:
“[O]nce you've got kids you worry about every single thing …
[M]y neighbours, some of whom have never smoked in their
lives, who do not drink, [who] like ﬁsh, who cook proper food,
are getting very, very ill” (Citizen Scientist A1, 2012).Ultimately, local compliance with the waste policies of the UK
central state was facilitated by immutable mobiles in striated space
via networked links between the local council (NPTCBC), and the
regulator Environment Agency Wales (EAW) acting as vehicles for
producing and reproducing the domination of central govern-
ment's ideological system (see Fig. 1) (cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 1987;
Latour, 1987). However, this top-down imposition of the UK gov-
ernment's centralised policies on waste management at a distance
from Whitehall had provoked (and continued to provoke) strong
rhizomatic resistance from residents, politicians and NGOs in
neighbouring communities via rhizomatic network linkage in
smooth space e using direct action, media and/or citizen science
activity (see Supplementary Material e Crymlyn Burrows). For
example, the technical expertise that dissenters built up challenge
ﬁndings in two key planning system documents, the Environ-
mental Impact Assessment and a Health Impact Assessment (HIA).
Because of the asymmetries of power between opposing networks,
the citizen scientists did not trust the dominant risk framings of the
documents' authors.
In summary, the limits to the top-down imposition of EfWwaste
policy were approached in Crymlyn Burrows. The co-developer, D1,
suggested that the project was very nearly derailed both during the
planning and operational phases (Interview with MREC co-
developer D1, HLC, 2009).Case study 2: Splott, Cardiff, South Wales, UK
The second case study from the UK covers events linked to the
Trident Park Energy Recovery Facility (ERF) near central Cardiff.
Located beside several large, very disadvantaged communities,
including Splott, the ERF's timeline of key events (Supplementary
Material e Cardiff) reveals a history of localised concern about
pollution and repeated lost opportunities for participation.
As with NPTCBC, Cardiff City Council's (CCC) waste planners
operate in striated space held in place by immutable mobiles, i.e.
there is linkage to actors and documents held by the EC, the central
state in London, the Welsh Assembly and the Environment Agency
Wales (EAW) (as per Fig. 1). After the EU Landﬁll Directive (1999)
and the publication of Wise About Waste: The National Waste
Strategy for Wales (2002) (Supplementary Material e England and
Wales waste-related policies), CCC waste planners calculated that
Lamby Way, the city's main landﬁll site, would reach capacity
around 2008. Much greater ﬁnes for landﬁlling then be imposed. In
2008, CCC approached neighbouring authorities to establish a
regional EfW management facility, later known as ‘Prosiect
Gwyrdd’ (Project Green). Collectively managing waste was
preferred as there were no suitable sites for waste disposal in
Cardiff. Also, CCC, like NPTCBC, wanted to avoid localised rhizo-
matic resistance.
Splott residents have higher levels of ill-health and greater
exposure to major risk factors affecting health (which are statisti-
cally signiﬁcantly). Community members are twice as likely to be
physically inactive, one and a half times more likely to smoke and
more likely to suffer from obesity when compared to those living in
the least deprived wards in Wales. Residents' health risk percep-
tions reﬂected this (Chadderton, Elliott, Hacking, Shepherd, &
Williams, 2013; Greenup, Powell, & Hacking, 2010). In 2016, a
community member describes ongoing concerns about the envi-
ronmental risks associated with the ERF and a neighbouring steel
works:
“[It's] having a big impact on people's health… with asthma…
[C]ancer in this area is rife… I've tried to grow vegetables and…
there's white dust all over them … dust all over your cars …
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… The community is just being shafted basically … [P]eople
don't speak up, they just plod along… and think it's the norm.”
(Community Member CCOM1, 2016)
In 2010, prior to licensing, activists from a local environmental
NGO became involved in a trial of strength with ERF's promoters
and the regulator. They complained that initial efforts to inform the
community were opaque and anti-democratic: the choice of
incineration as a technology had been made behind closed doors.
“Prosiect Gwyrdd was used to override local councils. Just chief
ofﬁcers and others [were] making decisions.” (Cardiff NGO, CNGO1,
2017).
The EAW granted an operating licence later in 2010 and the
facility opened in 2015. By this time, owner-operator Viridor had
secured a major public-private partnership from CCC and partners
with Prosiect Gwyrdd. The ERF has since gone on to process
municipal solid waste from nine local councils in South Wales. A
high volume of waste input is needed for this large facility to
operate efﬁciently. However, local NGOs have queried how the ERF
can perform efﬁciently and sustainability in future if domestic
recycling rates in South Wales continue to improve.
In summary, like Crymlyn Burrows, a local environmental NGO
attempted to enrol citizen scientists and tackle the ERF's scientiﬁc
and engineering legitimacy. For support, the NGO linked to a range
of local and outside supporters in its pursuit of a precautionary
approach towards waste governancewith the ERF's incinerator. The
wider community in Splott was initially very concerned. However,
more organized dissent soonwaned after the licensing decision and
there was relatively weak rhizomatic resistance in Splott compared
to Swansea. This appears to be due to the greater fragmentation of
local political networks in Splott (Interviewwith CNGO1, 2017). The
local NGO continues with a much-reduced trial of strength post the
licensing decision based on citizen science and legal challenges but
the Trident Park ERF now represents new ‘facts on the ground’. NGO
members continue to attend Liaison Group meetings with the
developer and regulator. They have asked for greater transparency
with emissions monitoring data (Interview with CNGO1, 2017). The
Splott community therefore continues to be shut out of decision-
making about the plant's operation and some indicate an ongoing
inability to successfully pursue their human health concerns
(Community Member CCOM1, 2016).Case study 3: Gaoantun, Beijing, China
As outlined above, EfW with incineration was being advocated
by the central state in Beijing from the mid-1990s because of the
rapidly growing waste problems (Wang, Jiang, Wu, & Liang, 2000)
(see Supplementary Material e Chinese waste-related policies). This
top-down governance began with the Law on Prevention and
Control of Environmental Pollution Caused by Solid Waste
(SCENPC, 1995) which also established a monitoring, inspection
and enforcement regime for solid waste disposal. Fines of up to
500,000 yuan (£58 K in 1996 prices) could be imposed. In this
context, the ﬁrst case study we examine in China is the Gaoantun
EfW plant in Beijing (see Supplementary Material e Beijing). The
timeline in the supplementary material shows that, after a delay,
this facility received its approval from Beijing's Environment Pro-
tection Bureau in 2004 (Johnson, 2013a). This occurred after the
publication of the Chinese central state's 2003White Book onwaste
disposal which encouraged the technological selection of the
newer generation of incinerators which Western multinational
engineering ﬁrms had been marketing in Europe and North
America.The supplementary material on the Gaoantun EfW plant also
shows that there were distinct historical sensitivities to an envi-
ronmental hazard in the area e a landﬁll - prior to planning
approval for the EfW plant in 2004. In terms of localised rhizomatic
resistance to Beijing's waste policy, residents were mainly middle-
class, not particularly united or persistent and were relatively less
well connected to more experienced activists (Johnson, 2013b).
They began complaining to local government about smells from a
landﬁll which had opened in Gaoantun in 2002. Trust in the local
authorities to improve matters was lost when nothing changed.
With the EfW plant's announcement in 2004, the environmental
health risk perceptions of the by-now-mistrustful local residents
shifted to focus on the imposition of the risks of incineration on
their local area. This included concerns about the potential toxic
impacts of dioxins, furans, and heavy metals, amongst other pol-
lutants (Johnson, 2013a, 2013b).
Public participation in the decision-making on incineration
technology and the siting of the Gaoantun EfW plant was extremely
limited because the national Chinese planning and environmental
regulatory systems did not entertain meaningful opportunities for
engagement. Trust in the national agency, SEPA, was lost in 2007
when campaigners learned that they had not been consulted in
2004 for the plant's EIA (which was undertaken in secret). Instead,
the views of ﬁfty nearby rural residents who were unlikely to
oppose the incinerator, had been taken into account (satisfying the
2003 EIA regulations, see Supplementary Material e Chinese waste-
related policy). This institutional context and the central Chinese
state's top-down approach to incineration policy provoked rhizo-
matic resistance amongst the local community in Gaoantun Com-
munity. These dissenters were most concerned about the
objectivity of scientiﬁc approach in SEPA's EIA undertaken in 2004
(and which was not released). These dissenters opted to challenge
the city authorities via persistent persuasion and citizen science
based on their own counter-expertise over perceived environ-
mental health risks:
“[They] demonstrated a good understanding of technical and
legal issues related to waste incineration … [and] claimed that
public participation was lacking and that SEPA [now MEP] had
‘not only harmed our environmental rights and interests, but
had also violated national laws’” (Zhou, Chen, Han, Wang, & Liu,
2007, cited in Johnson, 2013b, 115).
Gaoantun residents failed to prevent the incinerator from
operating, however, because their network was weaker than the
state's network. In the end, they were unable to obtain sufﬁcient
actor and resource support. Opportunities for public participation
after the licensing decision remained poor. The community dis-
senters found they were much less able to ﬁght the project once it
had been constructed.
Overall, the trial of strength in Gaoantun in Beijing has been
similar to that in both Crymlyn Burrows and Cardiff. While its
residents are middle class, not predominantly working class,
Gaoantun's residents were poorly connected and politically dis-
united (Johnson, 2013b). Like CATI, Gaoantun residents demon-
strated a good understanding of technical and legal issues related to
waste incineration. Just as in South Wales, they claimed that public
participationwas lacking and that this was the responsibility of the
environmental regulator, SEPA (later MEP). Community dissenters
in Gaoantun failed to prevent the EfW plant fromoperating because
their network was weaker than the state's network. They were
unable to obtain sufﬁcient actor and resource support in the trial of
strength. Similar to the experiences in Cardiff and Crymlyn Bur-
rows, community dissenters in Gaoantun were far less able to ﬁght
the project once it had been constructed. Opportunities for public
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The second case study from China is about an incinerator
intended for Panyu, a district of Guangzhou, a major city to the
north-west of Hong Kong. Here, the collective agency of dissenter
actor networks managed to overcome the initial governmental
imposition of an EfW plant via strong rhizomatic network linkage
(see the events' timeline in Supplementary Material e Gangzhou).
After the promotion of incineration began in the mid-1990s (see
Supplementary Materiale Chinese waste-related policy), the siting of
this plant, originally chosen in 2004, was ultimately relocated to a
new industrial location in nearby Dagang in 2013 (see
Supplementary Material e EfW case study sites).
The timeline shows that in the 2000s, the rise in privately-
owned apartments and homes in China's cities meant that, in the
southern district of Panyu, some of the ﬁrst large real estate de-
velopments were occupied bymiddle class Chinese residents. Many
were working in Guangzhou, located 120 km from Hong Kong, in
the most competitive and vibrant media environment in China
where journalists are encouraged to push the boundaries of
acceptability. At this time, one of two small landﬁll sites operating
nearby in Huijiang Village closed putting pressure on waste
disposal options. The EfW plant proposal received its approval in
2004 and a re-approval by the Guangzhou Planning Bureau in 2006
with a site nomination (as in Gaoantun, this siting process followed
on from the publication of the central state's 2003 White Book
legislation). However, precisely because public participation in the
planning phase was minimal, major protests as well as persistent
persuasion were pursued by members of local communities near
Panyu. Individuals working in the media were able to amplify the
news of the protests locally and nationally. Panyu's dissenters also
live in close proximity to a number of NGOs based in Hong Kong
and, via social media, learned of a successful anti-incineration
campaign that had previously been undertaken at Liulitun in Bei-
jing. Environmental risk perceptions centred on air pollution from
dioxins linked to incineration. A number of the dissenters' protest
tactics showed that they had adopted more high-proﬁle and
visually-striking approaches of environmentalist organisations in
Hong Kong and the West. As Lang and Xu (2013, 838e9) comment
on one demonstration:
“Some wore surgical masks or gas masks to emphasise fears
about air pollution, while others dressed in T-shirts emblazoned
with slogans such as ‘Dioxins, our new neighbors’ … and
shouted slogans such as ‘In governing people, respect public
opinion’”
Lang and Xu (2013) suggest that the Panyu protestors were not
classic not-in-my-backyarders (NIMBYs). They studied documents
produced by the Liulitun protesters, including research on overseas
cancellations of incinerator projects, and challenged the scientiﬁc
legitimacy of using incinerators to deal with municipal solid waste
suggesting incineration should be banned throughout China. One
Panyu protester said in a social media post:
“’We are not simply asking the government to move the project
out of Panyu. Wherever it is located, burning garbage harms
people's health and the environment, and we will protest’”
(Wang, Li, & Qiu, 2009, cited in; Lang & Xu, 2013).
Site approval was initially delayed and then cancelled in late
2009 by the Panyu municipal authorities to placate the rhizomaticresistance faced from local communities. This stage of the contes-
tation at this site therefore revealed the limits of the central state's
top-down approach to waste policy. In 2011, a new site was sug-
gested by the authorities. It was therefore through network
building and social media that the Panyu dissenters were able to
gather their own expertise from another group of protesters. They
then built their own case against the incinerator based on an
alternative scientiﬁc expertise and the speciﬁcs of local situation
precisely as the dissenters at Crymlyn Burrows and Cardiff did.
The trial of strength in Panyu played out differently to the other
three case studies. This, we suggest is because of Panyu's place-
speciﬁc characteristics. While the area had middle-class pro-
fessionals like Gaoantun, community members were employed in
the media. While members of the media are important network
members in all of the case studies, these individuals managed to
amplify news of the protests both locally and nationally causing
embarrassment to local and central institution (cf. Kasperson et al.,
1988). Panyu's dissenters were also in close proximity to NGOs in
Hong Kong. Via social media, they copied high-proﬁle and visually-
striking anti-incineration tactics. Direct action in Panyu proved to
be so politically embarrassing to the local municipal authorities e
networked to Beijing via various immutable mobiles centred on the
delivery of waste policy e that local ofﬁcials agreed to relocate the
EfW site from Panyu to an industrial site in nearby Dagang. In
Panyu's trial of strength, the limits to the top-down governmental
imposition of policy from Beijing were not only revealed but acted
on by Beijing. A signiﬁcantly more powerful ﬂuid space of dissent
opened up (Murdoch, 2006). Based on a dissenter network with
alternative expertise, networked actors marshalled speciﬁc local-
ised resources (Latour, 1987).
Conclusions
In the four case studies, the imposition of the policies of a
centralised state at a distance produced ﬂuid spaces where in-
dividuals and institutions attempted to increase their ‘power to’
change things, or their agency, via dissent. The spatio-temporal
edges of the relatively ordered, or striated, hierarchical space
become constrained or expanded over time as the central state and
its immutable mobiles e including via its local government
bureaux - struggle to deliver central policies on the ground.
Localised rhizomatic resistance to the imposition of top-down
waste policies e chieﬂy direct action, passive protest and/or citi-
zen science - provoke crackdowns to dissent. Enforcement is by
immutable mobiles particularly in places where protest space is not
structured in the dissenters' favour. Nevertheless, case study
timeline evidence suggests that dissent regarding EfW policy
reappears elsewhere in a rhizomatic fashion when conditions
become more favourable.
Overall, we pursued four analytical themes of democratic
openness, expertise, the role of space and place and the role of
regulation. The four timelines reveal that the operation of neither
planning system delivers meaningful participation (at least from
the perspective of concerned community members and NGOs).
Affected communities were largely unaware of plans for these four
EfW developments until late in the planning phase or even into the
construction phase. By this time, the key siting and technological
decisions had already been made. In each case study, actors
inhabiting striated space associated with technical expertise on
EfW regard incineration as a low-risk activity. The central state's
tokenistic approach to public participation in planning in both
countries, whether pre- or post- the licensing decision, was central
to the rejection of the state's expertise by community members,
chieﬂy its framing of risk (Hacking & Flynn, 2017). This rejection of
expertise underpins the dissenters' trials of strength or rhizomatic
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paigns of persistent persuasion, media attention, citizen science
and/or direct action. Such events then trigger further attempts by
the central state and its immutable mobiles to stiﬂe dissent (whilst
further justifying the top-down approach to waste policy delivery).
The empirical evidence suggests that a governmentality analysis
of waste governance in both countries is a complex policy subject
where expertise and technical knowledge is prioritised. Our
comparative analytical approach demonstrates the value of
extending descriptive models of governmentality in combination
with the concept of rhizomatic resistance into waste governance in
both countries. From this, we have shown that key critical di-
mensions such as public participation are rarely meaningful in
either country. A technocratic approach to waste governance mar-
ginalises local communities unless they too hold similar expertise
(Whatmore, 2009; Wynne, 1996). Community members were
shown to learn quickly, share and generate knowledge; create op-
portunities for spaces for dialogue via hybrid forums (Callon,
Lascoumes, & Barthe, 2009). Yet, in reality power relations be-
tween communities and the state remain distinctly unequal. Social
media and the internet can help to overcome such barriers (but not
necessarily reduce them). In terms of rhizomatic resistance, our
analysis shows that there needs to be a redeﬁning of the limits to
top-down, governmental approaches to waste policy delivery
which makes the process of governing more challenging.
Finally, in terms of a future research agenda, we suggest further
empirical testing of the ways the concept of rhizomatic resistance
compliments governmentality. Such work should be undertaken in
terms of producing better understandings of how different types of
relational space relate to power relations, knowledge and expertise.
We feel that more time and attention needs to be paid to the po-
tential for where and when public participation can better be
incorporated into the waste infrastructure development process.
Potential sustainability gains could, for example, be made with
hybrid fora further upstream from licensing decisions. Such dia-
logue must be tempered with realism about the political nature of
such contestations between actors. At a minimum, greater respect
is needed for the genuinely different perspectives of individuals
with alternative expertise in very speciﬁc localities.
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